Hamline University's School of Law's Journal of Public Law and
Policy
Volume 35
Issue 1 Transcending Intellectual Property Rights: An
Exploration Into the Unchartered Territories of the
Intangible, Infringed, and the Internet

Article 5

2-26-2014

Immigration After DOMA: How Equal is Marriage
Equality?
John Medeiros

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/jplp
Part of the Immigration Law Commons
Recommended Citation
35 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol'y 196

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@Hamline. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hamline University's
School of Law's Journal of Public Law and Policy by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Hamline.

Immigration After DOMA: How Equal is Marriage Equality?
John Medeiros1
INTRODUCTION
Under current immigration law, there are four primary avenues
to lawful permanent residence: family reunification, employmentbased immigration, asylum/refugee admission, and diversity based
on country of origin.2 Of these four avenues, family reunification
remains a top priority of our country’s legal immigration system.3
This priority is evidenced by the disproportionate number of
family-based visas over permanent residence visas offered through
other means,4 and these numbers do not even account for spouses,
parents, and minor children of United States citizens, all of whom
are considered “immediate relatives” and, therefore, exempt from
visa quotas.5 Since the early history of the United States,
immigrants have arrived with their families to build better lives than
those they left behind; this is, after all, the American Dream, the
ideal to prosper and succeed not only for themselves but for future
generations.
For this reason, family-based immigration has
historically been good public policy, but only for those who fall
within the traditional definition of family. For others whose
definition of family is not so traditional, such as married same-

1

Juris Doctor expected at Hamline University School of Law, May 2014.
RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RL 32235, U.S. IMMIGRATION
POLICY ON PERMANENT ADMISSION 1 (Dec. 20, 2010).
3
See Reform of Legal Immigration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 10 (1995) (statement
of INS Commissioner Doris Meissner praising the Clinton Administration and
the Jordan Commission for “strongly supporting the reunification of U.S. citizens
with their spouses and minor children as the Nation’s top priority for legal
immigration.”).
4
See Immigration & Nationality Act [hereinafter INA] § 201.
5
INA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i) (2013).
2
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gendered couples, the picture has been very different.6
It is estimated that nearly 36,000 United States citizens are
currently living in the United States with foreign-born, same-sex
partners.7 Until recently, same-gendered binational spouses have
been unable to avail themselves of the immigration advantages
shared by their heterosexual counterparts, largely because of
Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).8 That section
defines the term “marriage” at the federal level as “a legal union
between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the
word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or a wife.”9 This means that for immigration purposes,
married same-gendered binational couples could not seek those
benefits otherwise available to married opposite-gendered
binational couples. It also means that same-sex spouses of foreign
nationals authorized to come to the United States temporarily, could
not seek immigration benefits available to opposite-sex spouses of
immigrants seeking the same benefit.
This dual treatment changed, however, in the summer of
2013, when the Supreme Court heard the case of United States v.
Windsor,10 which challenged Section 3 of DOMA. In Windsor, the
Court held that by restricting the terms “marriage” and “spouse” to
heterosexual unions only, Section 3 of DOMA violated the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution.11 Following the Court’s ruling,
on July 1, 2013, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano
released a statement that United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS) would review family-based immigrant petitions
6

See infra Section II.
Gary J. Gates, Bi-National Same-Sex Unmarried Partners in Census 2000: A
Demographic Portrait, The Williams Project on Sexual Orientation Law and
Public Policy, UCLA School of Law (2005), http://escholarship.org/uc/item/
6kk5x4pn (last visited Sept. 2, 2013).
8
Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, §§ 1-3, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996)
(codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006))
[hereinafter DOMA].
9
Id.
10
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
11
Id.
7
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filed on behalf of same-sex spouses similar to how it reviews those
same petitions filed on behalf of heterosexual spouses.12
While
many
applauded
Secretary
Napolitano’s
announcement, many married, same-gendered couples still fail to
have complete redress. This article will explain why, despite this
recent announcement, there is still reason for married samegendered couples to navigate the immigration process with
trepidation. Section I of this article will examine how the historical
treatment of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)
immigrants to the United States helped shape the policy of failing to
recognize same-sex marriages pre-DOMA and helped lead to the
passage of DOMA. Section II will explore the immigration benefits
of marriage and DOMA’s impact on such benefits. Section III will
look at the USCIS’s traditional approach to recognizing marriage
validity, while Section IV will examine why this approach can be
worrisome for married same-gendered couples seeking immigration
benefits even in a post-DOMA world.
I. HOW THE HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF LGBT
IMMIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES HELPED SHAPE
THE POLICY OF FAILING TO RECOGNIZE SAME-SEX
MARRIAGES PRE-DOMA AND HELPED LEAD TO THE
PASSAGE OF DOMA
Under its broad plenary powers, Congress has the authority
to exclude immigrants from entering the United States.13 This
12

Statement of Janet Napolitano, Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Secretary, reported in “DHS Advises on Implementation of the Supreme Court
DOMA Ruling,” reprinted in 90 INTERPRETER RELEASES at 1420 (July 8, 2013).
13
While the Constitution does not expressly authorize Congress to regulate
immigration, its power to do so derives from several enumerated powers. The
Commerce Clause states that Congress may “regulate commerce with foreign
nations.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Migration Clause, also referred to as
the Importation Clause, states that the “Migration or Importation of such Persons
as any of the States now existing shall think proper to permit, shall not be
prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and
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plenary power is so broad it cannot be questioned by the courts.14
For example, in one of the most famous cases to illustrate
Congress’s plenary power in the context of immigration law, the
Supreme Court held in Chae Chan Ping v. United States that the
power to exclude is a proposition that is “not open to
controversy.”15 Congress’s broad plenary power has had a direct
impact on LGBT immigrants seeking entry into the United States.
In order to understand Congress’s historical treatment of LGBT
immigrants, one must look at the general history of immigrationrelated exclusions, since such exclusions gave rise to public
sentiment against undesirables, which has traditionally included
LGBT immigrants.
A. How the Historical Treatment of LGBT
Immigrants to the United States Helped Shape
the Policy of Failing to Recognize Same-Sex
Marriages pre-DOMA
Even before homosexuality was targeted as a ground of
exclusion, the prohibition against LGBT immigrants before that
time served as part of a larger scheme to exclude undesirables,
which one historian refers to as ensuring “a ‘proper’ sexual and
gender order.”16 While the Alien Act of June 25, 1798 allowed the
eight,” implying that Congress may permit migration after 1808. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9, cl. 1. The Naturalization Clause authorizes Congress to “establish an
uniform Rule of Naturalization.” U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 4. The War Clause
grants Congress the power to declare war. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 11. As
Justice Daniel concedes in his dissent in the Passenger Cases, the War Clause
means that “Congress can place in the condition of alien enemies all who are
under allegiance to a nation in open war with the United States.” Smith v. Turner,
48 U.S. 283, 182 (1849).
14
Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 456 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Because
only Congress has the power to set the requirements for acquisition of citizenship
by persons not born within the territory of the United States, federal courts cannot
exercise that power under the guise of their remedial authority.”).
15
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889).
16
EITHNE LUIBHEID & LIONEL CANTU JR., QUEER MIGRATIONS: SEXUALITY,
U.S. CITIZENSHIP, AND BORDER CROSSINGS xiv (2005).
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President to deport any foreign-born national whom he considered
“dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States,”17 the first
truly restrictive federal immigration law was passed on March 3,
1875. Named after its sponsor, Horace Page, the Page Act excluded
immigrants considered “undesirable.”18 Over a hundred years later,
the government would admit that the Page Act established “the
policy of direct federal regulation of immigration by prohibiting for
the first time the entry of undesirable immigrants.”19 Out of
growing concern of a booming prostitution industry that developed
after male Chinese immigrants came to America during the
California gold rush of 1848, Congress passed the Act, which
specifically excluded contract laborers, criminal convicts (except
those convicted of political offenses) and Asian women “imported
for the purposes of prostitution.”20
Seven years later, Congress passed the Immigration Law of
1882. Undesirables under that law included anyone deemed to be a
“convict, lunatic, idiot, or any [other] person unable to take care of
himself or herself without becoming a public charge.”21 This was
followed less than ten years later by the Immigration Act of 1891,
which excluded any immigrant who was “suffering from a
loathsome or a contagious disease,” polygamists, paupers, and
anyone convicted of a crime of moral turpitude.22 The significance
of these provisions would later reappear when those living with
AIDS started coming to the United States; such immigrants would

17

Alien and Sedition Acts, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570, 571 (1798).
Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration
Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641, 708 (2005) (referring to the Page Act as the
“Page Law.” The terms are used interchangeably).
19
Eithne Luibheid, A Blueprint for Exclusion: The Page Law, Prostitution, and
Discrimination against Chinese Women, in ENTRY DENIED: CONTROLLING
SEXUALITY AT THE BORDER 31 (2002) (citing U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 1991, A1-2).
20
Page Act of 1875, ch. 141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477.
21
Immigration Act of 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214.
22
Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084.
18
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be deemed excludable, primarily on health-related grounds and
public charge grounds.23
The 1891 Act is the first time the term “crime of moral
turpitude” appears in immigration law; it is a term that remains in
effect today. There is no statutory definition of “moral turpitude,”
which leaves the decision as to whether an offense involves moral
turpitude completely within the discretion of the immigration
authorities and the courts.24 Courts have held that the term “refers
generally to conduct which is inherently base, vile, or depraved,
contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed
between persons or society in general.”25
The next significant piece of immigration legislation was
passed in 1903. Under that Act, among those who were excludable
were epileptics, beggars, and political extremists (such as
anarchists);26 this Act later gave rise to the Immigration Act of
1917, which was legislation that was passed during World War I
that contained a comprehensive list of immigration exclusions,
many of which remain law today. This Act specifically excludes
the following immigrants, inter alia:
All idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded persons,
epileptics, insane persons; persons who have had one
or more attacks of insanity at any time previously;
persons of constitutional psychopathic inferiority;
persons with chronic alcoholism; paupers . . .
persons afflicted with tuberculosis in any form or
23

Bettina M. Fernandez, HIV Exclusion of Immigrants Under the Immigration
Reform & Control Act of 1986, 5 LA RAZA L.J. 65, 85 (1992) (“The INS seemed
to treat immigrants who are ‘likely to become a public charge,’ a category of
immigrants who are not allowed waivers, and immigrants infected with HIV as
being in the same category: persons who are not likely to be able to support
themselves in the event of legalization.”).
24
Shannon Minter, Sodomy and Public Morality Offenses Under U.S.
Immigration Law: Penalizing Lesbian and Gay Identity, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
771, 785 (1993).
25
See Matter of Franklin, 20 I. & N. Dec. 867, 868 (BIA 1994) (citing Matter of
Danesh, 19 I. & N. Dec. 669, 670 (BIA 1988); Matter of Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec.
225, 227 (BIA 1980)).
26
Immigration Act of 1893, 27 Stat. 569.
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with a loathsome or dangerous contagious disease;
persons not comprehended within any of the
foregoing excluded class who are found to be and
are certified by the examining surgeon as being
mentally or physically defective, such as physical
defect being of a nature which may affect the ability
of such alien to earn a living; persons who have been
convicted of or admit having committed a felony or
other crime or misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude; polygamists, or persons who practice
polygamy or believe in or advocate the practice of
polygamy; anarchists, or persons who believe in or
advocate the overthrow by force or violence of the
Government of the United States. . . prostitutes, or
persons coming into the United States for the
purpose of prostitution or for any other immoral
purpose . . . contract laborers . . . persons likely to
become a public charge . . .”27
By this time, immigration laws excluded both immoral
women and men entering for immoral purposes. Immorality
encompassed a host of sexual behaviors, including cohabitation
sexual relations outside of marriage28 and, arguably, sodomy.
But the legislation that would have the biggest impact on the
admission – or, rather, the exclusion – of homosexuals to the United
States is the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952. Enacted despite a
presidential veto, the Immigration Act of 1952 (which would serve
as the basis of what is known today as the Immigration and
Nationality Act, or the “INA”) heightened anti-immigrant sentiment
by “legislating the most dramatic expansion of the grounds for
exclusion in the nation’s history.”29 Among those excluded under
the Act were those who violated narcotics laws, persons entering
the country to engage in immoral sexual acts, addicts, Communists

27
28
29

Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875–76.
LUIBHEID & CANTU, supra note 16, at xv.
See Minter, supra note 24, at 776.
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and homosexuals.30 What made this Act so powerful was its scope.
Although the initial draft of the Act specifically listed
“homosexuals and sex perverts” as an excludable class, that
language was removed by the recommendation of the Public Health
Service, which advised Congress that the term “psychopathic
personality” was broad enough to include both homosexuality and
sexual perversion.31 As a result, the Act was amended to exclude
“[a]liens afflicted with psychopathic personality, epilepsy, or a
mental defect.”32
It was agreed that this language would
supposedly make the diagnosis of covert homosexuals easier.33 Not
only did the Act bar the entry of homosexuals on “psychopathic
personality” grounds, but it required that permanent residents
applying for naturalization show they were persons of “good moral
character.”34 In practice, this meant that lawful permanent residents
applying for naturalization who identified themselves as
homosexual would be considered persons suffering from a
“psychopathic personality,” and therefore ineligible for
naturalization for failing to satisfy the “good moral character”
requirement.35
30

INA § 212(a), Pub. L. No. 82–414, 66 Stat. 162, 18 (repealed 1990) (listing
grounds of exclusion).
31
See S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 345 (1950) (recommending that the category of
“mental defectives” under the 1917 Act be amended to include “homosexuals and
sex perverts.”). See also S. REP. NO. 82-1137, at 9 (1952) (“[t]he Public Health
Service has advised that the provision for the exclusion of aliens afflicted with
psychopathic personality or a mental defect which appears in the instant bill is
sufficiently broad to provide for the exclusion of homosexuals and sex
perverts.”).
32
INA § 212(a)(4) (repealed 1990).
33
See Minter, supra note 24, at 777 (noting that the PHS reasoned that this
general language included homosexuals, and that “in those instances in which the
disturbance in sexuality may be difficult to uncover, a more obvious disturbance
in personality may be encountered which would warrant a classification of
psychopathic personality or mental defect” as reported in Report of the Public
Health Service on the Medical Aspect of H.R. 2379, H.R. REP. NO. 82-1365, at
46-47 (1952)).
34
INA § 316(a).
35
Logan Bushell, Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor, Your Huddled Masses” –
Just as Long as They Fit the Heteronormative Ideal: U.S. Immigration Law’s
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In 1962, Congress was struck a blow when the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled in the case of Fleuti v. Rosenberg that the
term “psychopathic personality” was unconstitutionally vague when
applied to homosexuals.36 In response, Congress amended the INA
to specifically include the words “sexual deviate.” Its reason for
doing so was clear; it did so to “serve the purpose of resolving any
doubt on this point.”37 Two years later, the issue would come up
again before the United States Supreme Court in the case of
Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, but instead of
reaffirming the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Fleuti, the Court ruled
that the term “psychopathic personality” was clearly intended to
include immigrants who were homosexual.38 The Boutilier case
would become one of our country’s most devastating examples of
the harsh realities of exclusion laws against homosexual
immigrants.39
Exclusionary & Inequitable Treatment of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual,
Transgendered, and Queer Migrants, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 673, 682 (2013) (citing
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE
CLOSET 35 (1999) (quoting Immigration Service, Annual Report at 132 (1909))).
36
See Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652, 654-56 (9th Cir. 1962), vacated, 374
U.S. 449 (1963). George Fleuti, a lawful permanent resident from Switzerland,
was ordered deported on the grounds that he originally entered the United States
as a homosexual and, therefore, was a person inflicted with a “psychopathic
personality.”
The 9th Circuit held that “psychopathic personality” was
unconstitutionally vague, and invalidated Fleuti’s deportation order, stating,
“[t]he conclusion is inescapable that the statutory term ‘psychopathic
personality,’ when measured by common understanding and practices, does not
convey sufficiently definite warning that homosexuality and sex perversion are
embraced therein.” Id. at 658.
37
Hill v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 714 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir.
1983) (quoting S. REP. NO. 89-748, at 19 (1965); H.R. REP. NO. 89-745, at 16
(1965)).
38
See Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118, 120 (1967)
(quoting, “[t]he legislative history of the Act indicates beyond a shadow of a
doubt that the Congress intended the phrase ‘psychopathic personality’ to include
homosexuals such as petitioner.”).
39
After the Court’s decision to deport him back to Canada, Clive Boutilier
attempted suicide, resulting in permanent brain damage, and his parents were
forced to leave the United States to take care of their son for the next twenty
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B. How the Historical Treatment of
Homosexuals in the United States Helped Lead
to the Passage of DOMA
With the language of the law firmly on its side, the
government would continue to apply the term “psychopathic
personality” for the purposes of excluding homosexuals from
entering the United States for the next twenty-five years, until the
Immigration Act of 1990 officially removed sexual orientation from
the list of immigration exclusions.40 Yet it was only eight years
after the Boutilier decision that the first same-sex marriage case,
Adams v. Howerton, was filed with Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS, the former name of the USCIS).41 Unlike all
immigration cases before it involving homosexuality, the Adams
case asked something very different of the INS and of the federal
courts. It asked not only that homosexuality be validated, but also
that homosexual relationships be recognized as equal to
heterosexual relationships. This was a place the immigration
authorities and the federal courts were not willing to go. Needless
to say, the INS denied the case swiftly and harshly.42 Going even
further, the Appellate Court stated the following in its decision:
“Congress has determined that preferential status is
not warranted for the spouses of homosexual
years. See Bushell, supra note 35, at 685 (quoting Marc Stein, Forgetting and
Remembering a Deported Alien, HISTORY NEWS NETWORK, http://hnn.us/articles/
1769.html).
40
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601(a), 104 Stat. 4978
[hereinafter Immigration Act of 1990] (eliminating earlier laws that allowed the
Immigration Service to exclude immigrants based on sexual orientation).
41
Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982).
42
In one of the most famous examples of the Immigration Service’s harsh
treatment toward homosexual couples, the legal reason offered by the
Immigration Service for the denial of the petition filed by a U.S. citizen on behalf
of his foreign-born same sex spouse was that the petition had “failed to establish
that a bona fide marital relationship can exist between two faggots.” See Letter
from the Immigration & Naturalization Service to Richard Adams (Nov. 24,
1975), in JOYCE MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND
LESBIANS V. THE SUPREME COURT 221 (New York, Basic Books, 2001).
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marriages. Perhaps this is because homosexual
marriages never produce offspring, because they are
not recognized in most, if in any, of the states, or
because they violate traditional and often prevailing
societal mores. In any event, having found that
Congress rationally intended to deny preferential
status to the spouses of such marriages, we need not
further ‘probe and test the justifications for the
legislative decision.’”43
In issuing its scathing decision, the Adams Court went far
beyond making a decision based on the grounds of exclusion and
instead attempted to provide a federal definition of marriage based
on federal public policy long before DOMA became the law of the
land.44
The year 1990 saw the beginning of what appeared to be a
much more favorable treatment of homosexual immigrants. It was
then that Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1990.45 Only by
reading the congressional reports does one get to see the way that
this policy change came about:
The term “sexual deviation” (INA 212(a)(4)) was
included with the other mental health exclusion
grounds expressly for the purpose of excluding
homosexuals. Not only is this provision out of step
with current notions of privacy and personal dignity,
it is also inconsistent with contemporary psychiatric
theories . . . To put an end to this unfairness,

43

Adams, 673 F.2d. at 1042-43.
Scott C. Titshaw, The Meaning of Marriage: Immigration Rules and Their
Implications for Same-Sex Spouses in a World Without DOMA, 16 WM. & MARY
J. WOMEN & L. 537, 591-92 (2010) (“Unfortunately, the Adams court . . .
ventured on into uncharted territory, relying on the INS’s examination of marital
bona fides under the INA to demonstrate that Congress meant to create a new
federal definition of “marriage” for immigration purposes in the INA beyond “the
mere validity of a marriage under state law.”).
45
Immigration Act of 1990.
44
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Congress must repeal the “sexual deviation” ground
[for immigration exclusion].46
Despite the fact that the American Psychiatric Association
declared in 1973 that homosexuality was no longer a psychiatric
disorder,47 Congress continued to maintain the homosexuality ban
for nearly twenty years.48 Nevertheless, while many homosexuals
and immigrant rights advocates welcomed the tardy news, the
“good moral character” ground of exclusion was not removed from
the list immigration exclusions and still remains a requirement for
legal permanent residence to this day.49 As one historian notes,
“[a]lthough homosexuals may no longer be explicitly excluded on
sexuality grounds, their sexuality still makes them liable to be
constructed as lacking good moral character or otherwise ineligible
for permanent residence and citizenship.”50 While the Immigration
Act of 1990 was a step toward recognizing the legitimacy of
homosexuality, it was a far cry from recognizing the validity of
homosexual relationships, which is a different matter entirely.
What the shift in law meant was that homosexuals could achieve
the permanent residence previously denied them, as long as they
appeared to be persons of good moral character (i.e., still hiding
their homosexuality but for a different reason), and as long as their
permanent residence was not based on marriage to a spouse of the
same gender.
In an ironic twist of fate, the same year that Congress
removed homosexuality from the list of immigration exclusions,
three same-sex couples in Hawaii applied for marriage licenses and
all were denied because of their sexual orientation.51 The couples
sued, arguing that the Hawaii’s marriage statute violated their
46

H.R. REP. NO. 101-723, at 56 (1990).
John J. Conger, Proceedings of the American Psychological Association,
Incorporated, for the Year 1974: Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Council of
Representatives,
AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGIST,
30,
620-651
(1975),
http://www.apa.org/about/policy/discrimination.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2013).
48
See Immigration Act of 1990.
49
INA § 101(f).
50
LUIBHEID & CANTU, supra note 16, at xiv.
51
See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 48-52 (Haw. 1993).
47
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constitutional right of equal protection under the law.52 The Hawaii
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the couples.53 The decision caught
the public by storm, and many members of Congress grew
concerned that gay marriage would sweep across the states, and that
federal benefits would have to be extended to same-sex married
couples.54 Homosexuality was one thing, after all, but sanctioning
homosexual relationships posed a very new threat, and Congress
became afraid. This fear was compounded by the belief that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution would force states
that did not recognize same-sex marriages to do so if such
marriages were legally performed elsewhere.55 It was precisely this
fear that led to the passage of DOMA.56 With its surprising scarcity
of words, DOMA had two important provisions. The first affirmed
that no state shall be required to recognize same sex marriages
lawfully performed in other states.57 The second sealed the

52

Id.
Id. at 48, ¶¶ 23, 24 (quoting, “Sex is a ‘suspect category’ for purposes of equal
protection analysis under article I, section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution,” and
“HRS § 572-1 [the statute defining marriage] is therefore subject to the ‘strict
scrutiny’ test. HRS § 572-1 is presumed to be unconstitutional unless it can be
shown that the statute's sex-based classification is justified by compelling state
interests and that it is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgements of
constitutional rights.”).
54
H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905,
2906.
55
Id. at 7-10.
56
Id. at 2 (quoting as the need for DOMA, “[I]f Hawaii (or some other State)
recognizes same-sex ‘marriages,’ other States that do not permit homosexuals to
marry would be confronted with the complicated issue of whether they are
nonetheless obligated under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States
Constitution to give binding legal effect to such unions. With regard to federal
law, a decision by one State to authorize same-sex ‘marriage’ would raise the
issue of whether such couples are entitled to federal benefits that depend on
marital status. H.R. 3396 anticipates these complicated questions by laying down
clear rules to guide their resolution, and it does so in a manner that preserves each
State’s ability to decide the underlying policy issue however it chooses.”).
57
DOMA, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (“[N]o State . . .
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of
53
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definition of marriage at the federal level as a union solely between
one man and one woman.58 In the context of immigration law, this
legislation would prove detrimental.
II. THE IMMIGRATION BENEFITS OF MARRIAGE AND
DOMA’S IMPACT ON SUCH BENEFITS
When posed with the question of why it is important for the
government to recognize the validity of marriages, the first response
that comes to the minds of most people is that recognition leads to
permanent residence for foreign-born spouses of United States
citizens and lawful permanent residents. While this conclusion is
certainly true, immigration benefits extend even further,
encompassing both those wishing to come to the United States
permanently as well as those seeking to enter on a temporary basis.
A. DOMA’s Impact on Immigrants
An “immigrant” is a person who seeks to enter the United
States permanently.59 Under current law, most foreign-born
nationals immigrate to the United States on the basis of family
reunification.60 While United States immigration law is a quotabased system, the primary category of persons exempt from the
quota is that of spouses of United States citizens (referred to by the
law as “immediate relatives”).61 Those who are subject to
numerical limits include spouses of lawful permanent residents,
any other State . . . respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that
is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State.”).
58
Id. § 3(a) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any
ruling, regulation, or interpretation of various administrative bureaus and
agencies of the United States, the world ‘marriage’ means only a legal union
between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’
refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”).
59
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 817 (9th ed. 2009).
60
Titshaw, supra note 44, at 546.
61
INA § 201(b)(2). The term “immediate relative” also encompasses children of
U.S. citizens and parents of U.S. citizens if their U.S. citizen child is at least
twenty-one years old.
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spouses who are derivatives of primary beneficiaries of
employment-based visa petitions, and spouses of applicants selected
under the diversity visa program.62 For these individuals eligibility
for lawful permanent residence in the United States is dependent
upon the recognition of their marriage.
Section 3 of DOMA defines marriage as solely between one
man and one woman for the purposes of federal benefits.63 Unlike
DOMA, the INA’s definitions of “spouse” and “marriage” do not
address same-sex relationships, despite the fact that Congress
redrafted and amended the INA over a hundred times in the
statute’s history.64 This would suggest that Congress intended to
leave the terms undefined in the INA. Nevertheless, prior to the
Windsor decision, the definition sealed by DOMA prevented samesex spouses of United States citizens and lawful permanent
residents to be recognized as beneficiaries of their spouses’
petitions, even though they were lawfully married in a jurisdiction
that recognized their marriage.
B. DOMA’s Impact on Nonimmigrants
Marriage recognition also determines eligibility for a host of
immigration benefits spanning well beyond the approval of spousal
petitions for permanent residence.65 For example, foreign-born
nationals coming to the United States on a temporary basis are
referred to as “nonimmigrants,”66 and the law makes nonimmigrant
62

The annual quota for spouses and unmarried children of lawful permanent
residents ranges from 226,000 to 480,000. INA § 201(c). This far exceeds the
annual quota of 140,000 for those seeking to immigrate through the employmentbased visa categories. INA § 201(d). It is also at least four times the annual quota
of 55,000 for those seeking to immigrate through the diversity visa program.
INA § 201(e).
63
DOMA, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
64
Jessica Portmess, Until the Plenary Power Do Us Part: Judicial Scrutiny of
the Defense of Marriage Act in Immigration After Flores-Villar, 61 AM. U. L.
REV. 1825, 1845 (2012).
65
See generally INA § 101(a)(15) (listing the various types of nonimmigrant, or
temporary, visas).
66
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 59, at 48 (under adjustment of status).
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visas available to their recognized spouses. There are a myriad of
spousal nonimmigrant visa categories under the INA, all require
marriage recognition. These categories include the following:
spouse of an ambassador and other diplomat;67 the spouse of a
nonimmigrant treaty trader or investor;68 the spouse of a foreign
student pursuing a degree;69 the spouse of a representative of a
recognized foreign government to an international organization;70
the spouse of a temporary professional worker;71 the spouse of a
journalist or other representative of foreign informational media;72
the spouse of an exchange visitor or foreign medical graduate;73 the
fiancé(e) of a United States citizen;74 the spouse of an intracompany transferee (manager, executive, or individual with
specialized knowledge);75 the spouse of a vocational or
nonacademic student;76 the spouse of a representative of a member
state of NATO;77 the spouse of an individual with extraordinary
ability in the arts, sciences, business, or athletics;78 the spouse of an
internationally recognized artist or entertainer;79 the spouse of a
participant in an international cultural exchange program;80 the
spouse of a minister or religious worker;81 the spouse of an
informant who supplies critical information related to a crime;82 the
spouse of a person who is a victim of severe trafficking in

67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

INA § 101(a)(15)(A).
INA § 101(a)(15)(E).
INA § 101(a)(15)(F).
INA § 101(a)(15)(G).
INA § 101(a)(15)(H).
INA § 101(a)(15)(I).
INA § 101(a)(15)(J).
INA § 101(a)(15)(K).
INA § 101(a)(15)(L).
INA § 101(a)(15)(M).
INA § 101(a)(15)(N).
INA § 101(a)(15)(O).
INA § 101(a)(15)(P).
INA § 101(a)(15)(Q).
INA § 101(a)(15)(R).
INA § 101(a)(15)(S).

212

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW & POLICY

Vol. 35:1

persons;83 the spouse of a victim of criminal activity;84 and the
spouse of a permanent resident awaiting availability of a permanent
resident visa.85 Qualifying foreign-born nationals whose marriages
are recognized by the United States may have their spouses
accompany them in any of the categories listed above for the
duration of their length of admission. Furthermore, with many of
the spousal nonimmigrant categories, the recognized spouse is
authorized to work in the United States.86 In the nonimmigrant
context, marriage recognition is essential for a person to be eligible
to accompany his or her spouse to the United States instead of being
separated for years.
Prior to the Windsor decision that struck down Section 3 of
DOMA, there were thirteen countries in the world that recognized
same-sex marriage.87 Additionally, Mexico had regional provisions
that allowed same-sex couples to marry, and still does to this day.88
One often unreported impact of DOMA on immigration benefits
concerns foreign-born nationals lawfully married in one of these
countries, yet whose same-sex spouses were ineligible for entry in
the nonimmigrant visa categories mentioned above, despite the
lawful recognition of their marriage abroad. As a matter of public
policy, these categories are essential to the United States
maintaining professional, international, and diplomatic relations by
increasing global interaction and trade.
Nevertheless,
nonimmigrants married to same-sex spouses have had to choose
between coming to the United States and leaving their spouses
behind for what could amount to years, or abandoning the
83

INA § 101(a)(15)(T).
INA § 101(a)(15)(U).
85
INA § 101(a)(15)(V).
86
See generally 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12 (2011) (listing the classes of aliens
authorized to work in the United States).
87
These countries included Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Canada, South Africa,
Norway, Sweden, Portugal, Iceland, Argentina, Denmark, France, and Brazil.
The Freedom to Marry Internationally, FREEDOM TO MARRY,
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/landscape/entry/c/international (last visited Sept.
2, 2013). Since the Windsor decision, Uruguay, New Zealand, and Great Britain
have been added to that list. Id.
88
Id.
84
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opportunity to work or study in the United States altogether.
C. The Repeal of Section 3 of DOMA
On June 26, 2013, the Supreme Court held in Windsor that
Section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional.89 Immediately following
the Court’s ruling the federal government responded. First
Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano released a
statement directing USCIS to review immigrant visa petitions filed
on behalf of a same-sex spouse in the same manner as those filed on
behalf of an opposite-sex spouse.90 That statement was followed up
with the Secretary’s answers to Frequently Asked Questions,
among which confirmed that the ruling also meant that United
States citizens could file nonimmigrant petitions on behalf of
foreign-born fiancés/fiancées; permanent residents who are the
same-sex spouse of a United States citizen would be eligible for
expedited naturalization; and waivers formerly reserved only for
opposite-sex spouses of United States citizens or lawful permanent
residents would be eligible for same-sex spouses as well.91 Shortly
thereafter the Board of Immigration Appeals held that, in light of
the Supreme Court’s decision, Section 3 of DOMA is no longer “an
impediment to the recognition of lawful same-sex marriages and
spouses if the marriage is valid under the laws of the State where it
was celebrated.”92 This was followed by United States Secretary of
State John Kerry’s cable providing guidance to embassies around
the world on how to issue immigrant and nonimmigrant visas
involving same-sex couples.93
89

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675.
Statement of Janet Napolitano, supra note 12.
91
Statement of Janet Napolitano, Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Secretary, reported in “Same-Sex Marriages,” reprinted in 90 INTERPRETER
RELEASES at 1611 (Aug. 5, 2013).
92
Matter of Zeleniak, 26 I. & N. Dec. 158, 159 (BIA 2013).
93
Cable of John Kerry, “Next Step on DOMA: Guidance for Posts,” D.O.S.
Mem. 00112850 (Aug. 13, 2013), http://travel.state.gov/pdf/
Next_Steps_On_DOMA_Guidance_For_Posts_August_2013.pdf (last visited
Sept. 23, 2013).
90

214

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW & POLICY

Vol. 35:1

Despite the administration’s swift change in policy and the
Court’s ruling, two side effects of DOMA remain. The first is the
creation of statutes that define marriage as solely between one man
and one woman. The second is the related phenomenon of state
constitutional amendments prohibiting same-sex marriages.
Twenty-five states have both passed legislation and amended their
constitutions to ban same-sex marriage.94 An additional four states
have passed legislation without amending their constitutions,95
while four others have amended their constitutions without passing
legislation.96 This matters in the immigration context because,
although the federal government has exclusive control over United
States immigration law, policy, regulation, and enforcement,97
states often play a role in the immigration process. 98
III. THE USCIS’S TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO
RECOGNIZING MARRIAGE VALIDITY
In deciding Adams v. Howerton, the Ninth Circuit
established a two-prong test to determine the validity of a
marriage.99 Under the Adams test, the Court reasoned that the
marriage must first be valid under state law.100 If it is, then an
analysis must be done to determine that the marriage is also valid

94

These states include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. State Level Marriage
Equality, MARRIAGE EQUALITY USA, http://www.marriageequality.org/sites/
default/files/National%20Map%20%2318%20%2819-Dec-2013%29.pdf
(last
visited Dec. 19, 2013).
95
These states include Indiana, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id.
96
These states include Colorado, Nebraska, Nevada, and Oregon. Id.
97
See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976); Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982)
(superseded by statute as stated in Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting,
131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011)).
98
See infra Section III.
99
Adams, 673 F.2d at 1038.
100
Id.
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under the INA.101 In practice, however, the Ninth Circuit’s test is
problematic for two reasons. First, the INA does not define the
word “spouse.”102 Second, the test is too general to be applicable in
all situations. For example, the first prong of the test fails because
it does not take into account marriages performed in other
countries, nor does it acknowledge that a marriage recognized in
one state may not be recognized in another.103 The second prong is
also flawed because it takes the position that federal law determines
marital status, which is exactly what the Supreme Court found
unconstitutional when it rendered its decision in Windsor.104 In
Adams, the Court looked to other sections of the immigration
statute that had nothing to do with marriage –specifically, the
homosexuality ground of exclusion – and reasoned that, because
Congress excluded homosexuals from entering the United States, a
marriage involving homosexuals could not possibly be valid under
the INA.105
Such a decision is not possible today, since
homosexuality is no longer a ground for exclusion.
Although Adams has not been overruled, it should not
control in determining marriage validity.106 Twenty years after the
Adams decision, the Ninth Circuit revisited the issue of marriage

101

Id.
In re Lovo-Lara, 23 I. & N. Dec. 746, 748 (BIA 2005).
103
Titshaw, supra note 44, at 597.
104
Ironically, prior to DOMA, a federal court found that the BIA did not act
rationally by relying exclusively on state law to define marriage when it upheld
the denial of an application for cancellation of deportation of a Canadian-born
applicant who claimed to be a common law spouse even though California did
not recognize common law marriages. Kahn v. INS, 20 F.3d 960, 962 (9th Cir.
1994). In his dissent, Judge Kozinski expressed outrage at the notion of a
national definition for marriage (quoting “[b]y purporting to establish a federal
law of domestic relations, the majority boldly goes where no federal court has
gone before.”). Id. at 967.
105
Adams, 673 F.2d at 1040-41 (“We think it unlikely that Congress intended to
give homosexual spouses preferential admission treatment under section 201(b)
of the Act when, in the very same amendments adding that section, it mandated
their exclusion.”).
106
Titshaw, supra note 44, at 595-96.
102
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validity in Agyeman v. INS.107 In a footnote the Court set forth a
more reasonable three-prong approach.108 It ruled that for a
marriage to confer immigration benefits, it must be legally valid at
the place of celebration; be bona fide; and not violate public
policy.109 This position is consistent with the approach followed by
the USICS when adjudicating petitions.110
A. Marriage Must Be Valid at the Place of
Celebration
The first prong of the test referenced in the Agyeman
decision reinforces the general rule that a marriage will be
recognized if it was “entered into in accordance with the laws of the
place where the marriage took place.”111 This statutory language is
also supported by case law.112

107

Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 879 n.2. See also Titshaw, supra note 44, at 550.
109
Id.
110
See Adjudicators’ Field Manual ch. 21.3(a)(2)(B) (“As a general rule, the
validity of a marriage is judged by the law of the place of celebration. If the
marriage is voidable but no court action to void the marriage has taken place, it
will be considered valid for immigration purposes. However, if a marriage is
valid in the country where celebrated but considered offensive to public policy of
the United States, it will not be recognized as valid for immigration purposes.
Plural marriages fall within this category.”).
111
INA § 216(d)(1)(A)(i)(I).
112
See U.S. v. Sacco, 428 F.2d 264, 268 (“The general rule is that the validity of
a marriage is determined by the law of the state where it took place.”). See also
Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 223 (1934); Matter of Gamero, 14 I. & N. Dec.
674 (BIA 1974); Matter of Levine, 13 I. & N. Dec. 244 (BIA 1969); Matter of
Luna, 18 I. & N. Dec. 385 (BIA 1983); Matter of Bautista, 16 I. & N. Dec. 602
(BIA 1978); Matter of Arenas, 15 I. & N. Dec. 174 (BIA 1975); Matter of P-, 4 I.
& N. Dec. 610 (BIA, Acting A.G. 1952); Matter of Ma, 15 I. & N. Dec. 70 (BIA
1974) (Where one of the parties to a marriage has a prior divorce, the court will
look to the law of the state where the subsequent marriage was celebrated to
determine whether or not that state would recognize the validity of the divorce).
108
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B. Marriage Must Be Bona Fide
The second prong of the test requires that the marriage be
bona fide. A marriage is not bona fide if the parties do not intend to
live together as husband and wife and therefore are not recognized
for immigration purposes.113 Evidence to establish the bona fides
of a marriage can include proof that the beneficiary has been listed
as the petitioner’s spouse on insurance policies, property leases,
income tax forms, or bank accounts; as well as testimony or other
evidence regarding courtship, wedding ceremony, shared residence
and experiences.114
113

Adams, 673 F.2d at 1040. See also Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th
Cir. 1979) (“A marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to
establish a life together at the time they were married.”); Lutwak v. United States,
344 S. Ct. 604, 611 (1953) (“Congress did not intend to provide aliens with an
easy means of circumventing the quota system by fake marriages in which
neither of the parties ever intended to enter into the marital relationship; that
petitioners so believed is evidenced by their care in concealing from the
immigration authorities that the ostensible husbands and wives were to separate
immediately after their entry into this country and were never to live together as
husband and wife. The common understanding of a marriage, which Congress
must have had in mind when it made provision for ‘alien spouses' in the War
Brides Act, is that the two parties have undertaken to establish a life together and
assume certain duties and obligations.”); Matter of Laureano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 1, 1
(BIA 1983) (“A marriage entered into for the primary purpose of circumventing
the immigration laws, commonly referred to as a fraudulent or sham marriage, is
not recognized for the purpose of obtaining immigration benefits.”).
114
See Matter of Phillis, 15 I. & N. Dec. 385, 387 (BIA 1975). See also Matter
of Soriano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 764, 766 (BIA 1988); Matter of Laureano, 19 I. & N.
Dec. 1, 1 (BIA 1983) (“In determining whether a marriage is fraudulent for
immigration purposes, the conduct of the parties after the marriage is relevant as
to their intent at the time of marriage; evidence to establish intent may take many
forms, including, but not limited to, proof that the beneficiary has been listed as
the petitioner's spouse on insurance policies, property leases, income tax forms,
or bank accounts; and testimony or other evidence regarding courtship, wedding
ceremony, shared residence and experiences.”); Agyeman, 296 F.3d at 882-83
(“Evidence of the marriage's bona fides may include: jointly-filed tax returns;
shared bank accounts or credit cards; insurance policies covering both spouses;
property leases or mortgages in both names; documents reflecting joint
ownership of a car or other property; medical records showing the other spouse as
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C. Marriage Must Not Violate Public Policy
The final prong of the three part test requires that the
marriage not violate public policy.115 There are two types of public
policy considerations when it comes to marriage in the immigration
context: federal public policy, and state public policy.
One accomplishment of the now-defunct Section 3 of
DOMA allowed the USCIS to deny petitions filed by United States
citizens and permanent residents on behalf of their lawful same-sex
spouses on the grounds that the marriage violated federal public
policy, since federal law defined marriage as solely between one
man and one woman.116 But even before DOMA was around to
accomplish this goal, the courts have long held that federal public
policy is a consideration when determining marriage validity, and
that a marriage in violation of federal public policy is not a valid
marriage.117 One such example of marriage that is a violation of

the person to contact; telephone bills showing frequent communication between
the spouses; and testimony or other evidence regarding the couple's courtship,
wedding ceremony, honeymoon, correspondences, and shared experiences.”).
115
See Hi v. Weedin, 21 F.2d 801, 801-802 (9th Cir. 2002) (“An exception to
the general rule, however, is ordinarily made in the case of marriages repugnant
to the public policy of the domicile of the parties, in respect of polygamy, incest,
or miscegenation, or otherwise contrary to its positive laws.”). See also Matter of
H, 9 I. & N. Dec. 640, 641 (BIA 1962) (“An exception to the general rule,
however, is ordinarily made in the case of marriages repugnant to the public
policy of the domicile of the parties, in respect to polygamy, incest, or
miscegenation, or otherwise contrary to its positive laws. Such cases involve
marriages which are repugnant to the public policy of the domicile of the parties
or to the laws of nature as generally recognized in Christian countries.”).
116
DOMA, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
117
See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (“[F]rom the earliest
history of England polygamy has been treated as an offence against society.”).
See also In re Lovo-Lara, 23 I. & N. Dec. 746, 753 (BIA 2005) (reversing the
denial of a petition filed by a transgender U.S. citizen on behalf of her foreignborn spouse, ruling that the decision was based on an interpretation of INA
201(b) and not by finding a general federal public policy against the recognition
of such marriages).
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federal public policy is plural marriages.118 Another is fraudulent
marriages.
Although the general rule is that a marriage that is valid
where it was celebrated is valid everywhere, principles of conflict
of laws allow for an exception if the marriage violates the “strong
public policy” of another state.119 Many state courts have failed to
recognize the validity of a marriage performed elsewhere on the
grounds that the marriage violated that state’s public policy where
couples are domiciled in that state.120 On occasion, the federal
courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) have also
recognized these exceptions for immigration purposes.121
Typically, these cases have fallen into three main categories: (1)
marriages between biracial spouses; (2) marriages between those
who are related by blood, and (3) marriages involving a spouse who
has not yet reached that state’s age of consent.
There have been two BIA cases questioning the validity of
marriages between biracial spouses in the context of immigration
benefits.122 In the 1949 case of Matter of D –, the BIA failed to
recognize the validity of a marriage between a Norwegian-born
immigrant and his United States citizen wife of African descent
because the two were married in Canada for the purpose of
circumventing the anti-miscegenation laws of North Dakota, which
made it a crime for African-Americans and whites to cohabit or to
get married in that state.123 In this case the Court found no violation
of federal public policy, but a strong violation of state public policy.
118

See Matter of Darwish, 14 I. & N. Dec. 307, 308 (BIA 1973) (dismissing an
appeal of a petition previously denied on the ground that plural marriages offend
the public policy of the United States, even though the petitioner’s second
marriage may be valid under Jordanian law).
119
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971). See also
Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303-04 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (“Florida is not
required to recognize or apply Massachusetts’ same-sex marriage law because it
clearly conflicts with Florida’s legitimate public policy of opposing same-sex
marriage.”); Portmess, supra note 64, at 1846.
120
Titshaw, supra note 44, at 565.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Matter of D –, 3 I. & N. Dec. 480, 481-82 (BIA 1949).

220

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW & POLICY

Vol. 35:1

The second case concerning the validity of mixed racial marriage in
the immigration context involved a Filipino man who was married
in Washington, D.C.124 In that case the BIA recognized the validity
of the marriage to the detriment of the petitioner, who was later
found to be of bad moral character because of an adulterous
relationship with the woman he later married. The petitioner
argued that his first marriage was not valid because, after marrying
in Washington, D.C., the couple moved to Maryland, which had a
criminal statute against marriage between a “white person . . . and a
member of the Malay race.”125 But because the state did not have a
criminal cohabitation statute, the Court ruled that the marriage was
not in violation of state public policy and was therefore valid.126 As
with Matter of D –, for immigration purposes, the violation of state
public policy was not determined by the biracial marriage as much
as it was determined by violation of a criminal statute of the state of
domicile.
Marriages of consanguinity traditionally involve marriages
between uncles and nieces, aunts and nephews, and cousins. In the
immigration context, such marriages are considered valid if they do
not violate the strong public policy expressed in the criminal statute
of the couple’s state of domicile.127 The BIA has held that where a
state has a criminal statute against consanguinity or against
cohabitation of spouses who evade the state’s laws by marrying in
another state that recognizes marriages of consanguinity, the
marriage will not be valid for immigration purposes.128

124

Matter of C –, 7 I. & N. Dec. 768 (BIA 1956).
Id. at 110.
126
Id. at 113.
127
Matter of T –, 8 I. & N. Dec. 529, 531 (BIA 1960) (“It is to be noted that
Congress has not expressed any public policy excluding a spouse on the ground
of consanguinity and that immigration laws are silent on this point; recourse must
be had to state law for expressions of such public policy.”). See also Titshaw,
supra note 44, at 569.
128
Matter of Zappia, 12 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1967) (refusing to recognize a
marriage between first cousins in South Carolina because the couple was
domiciled in Wisconsin, where such marriages were void and subject to criminal
sanctions). See also Angelo Bartolomeo, Department of Justice Not Defending
125
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Concerning marriages involving a spouse that has not yet
reached the age of consent, the BIA takes a similar position as it
does with marriages of consanguinity: if the marriage is recognized
in both the state of celebration and the state of domicile, it will be
recognized by the BIA.129 For example, in Matter of Agoudemos,
the BIA held that the marriage of a sixteen year old girl was valid
for immigration purposes because she was of the age of consent for
both the state where the marriage was celebrated and the state
where the couple was domiciled.130
The state public policy cases, referenced above, all have a
common thread: the test used to determine if the marriage violated
state public policy was whether or not the state of domicile had a
criminal statute forbidding the marriage, and if the parties to the
marriage violated that statute. Given the logic of the Agoudemos
Court, if same-sex marriages violated a criminal statute, such
marriages would arguably violate the state public policy.
IV. WHY THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO
MARRIAGE VALIDITY CAN BE WORRISOME FOR
MARRIED SAME-GENDERED COUPLES SEEKING
IMMIGRATION BENEFITS IN A POST-DOMA WORLD
On July 8, 2013, Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet
Napolitano, stated that family-based immigrant petitions filed on
behalf of same-sex spouses would be reviewed in the same manner
as those petitions filed on behalf of heterosexual spouses.131 Since
issuing that statement, the USCIS has provided guidance to samegendered binational couples on how to apply for immigration
benefits through marriage.132 In adjudicating such petitions, the

the Defense of Marriage Act: Politically Significant, Legally Irrelevant?, 62
DEPAUL L. REV. 857, 861 (2013).
129
See Matter of Agoudemos, 10 I. & N. Dec. 444, 445-46 (BIA 1964).
130
Id.
131
Statement by Janet Napolitano, supra note 12.
132
USCIS, Same Sex Marriages, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/
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USCIS should follow the three-prong approach to marriage validity
described in Part III, in lieu of the two-prong approach referenced
in Adams. Yet even with the more favorable three-prong test, those
seeking immigration benefits under this analysis would be best
advised to proceed with caution. To understand why such caution
is warranted, it is worth considering how each prong of the test
could be applied to married same-gendered couples seeking
immigration benefits.
A. Same-Sex Marriages Must Be Valid at the Place
of Celebration
The first requirement is that the marriage must be valid in
the place of celebration. This is true with marriage in all
immigration cases, and same-sex marriages should not be treated
any differently. If same-sex marriage is recognized in the foreign
country, or state, where it took place, then this should satisfy the
first prong of the test. However, many states and countries
recognize civil unions, but not same-sex marriage. The USCIS
does not recognize civil unions for immigration purposes.
B. Same Sex Marriage Must Be Bona Fide
For a marriage to be bona fide, it means it must be made in
good faith, and without fraud or deceit.133 For married, samegendered couples, this may be challenging. It is not uncommon for
same-sex couples to include a person who was previously married
to someone of the opposite gender, and there are many valid
reasons why this might be. Perhaps that person is bisexual, or was
married before becoming aware of his/her own sexual orientation,
or did not fully accept their orientation, or perhaps that person was

menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=2543215c310af310
VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=2543215c310af310VgnVCM
100000082ca60aRCRD (last visited Sept. 29, 2013).
133
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 59, at 199.
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drawn to marriage by strong religious beliefs. In many countries,
including some where homosexuality is illegal, arranged marriages
are common and carry social status for the individuals. In such
countries, it would go against cultural and societal norms for
individuals to not marry. Given this reality, married same-gendered
couples should be cautious of an immigration officer who could
conclude that either the prior marriage was fraudulent, or the
current marriage is fraudulent. In either case, the situation is likely
to raise the bar in proving the bona fides of the marriage.
On a related note, homosexuals from countries that
criminalize homosexual activity should be cautious when answering
questions related to criminal grounds of exclusion. For example,
one question asks, “[ha]ve you EVER, in or outside the United
States . . . knowingly committed any crime of moral turpitude . . .
for which you have not been arrested?”134 Although sexual
orientation has been taken off the list of immigration exclusions,
criminal activity has not.
C. Same Sex Marriage Must Not Violate Public
Policy
In determining if same sex marriage violates public policy,
we first look to federal public policy arguments and then to state
public policy arguments.
Federal public policy objections to heterosexual marriage
have traditionally been rare.135 The same is not true, however, for
same-sex marriages.136 For seventeen years, from 1996 until the
June 2013, Section 3 of DOMA provided a federal public policy
objection to same-sex marriage. But even with the repeal of
Section 3, there are still federal public policy concerns that must be
taken into consideration when determining the validity of same-sex
134

USCIS Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust
Status, 3, http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-485.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2013).
135
Titshaw, supra note 44, at 602.
136
See DOMA, Pub. L. No. 104-199, §§ 1-3, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). See also
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675; Adams, 673 F.2d 1036; Joyce Murdoch & Deb Price,
supra note 42; Matter of Zeleniak, 26 I. & N. Dec. 158, 159 (BIA 2013).
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marriage for immigration purposes. To fully understand these
concerns, it helps to look at what the Supreme Court decided in
Windsor.
In Windsor the Court did not rule that the federal
government must recognize all same-sex marriages; it ruled only
that Section 3 of DOMA, which provides a federal definition for
marriage, is unconstitutional because it violated the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution.137 Despite its ruling, the Court upheld
Congress’s power to enact federal laws that bear on marital rights to
further federal public policy. Consider the following statement
from the opinion:
By history and tradition the definition and regulation
of marriage, as will be discussed in more detail, has
been treated as being within the authority and realm
of the separate States. Yet it is further established
that Congress, in enacting discrete statutes, can make
determinations that bear on marital rights and
privileges. Just this Term the Court upheld the
authority of the Congress to pre-empt state laws,
allowing a former spouse to retain life insurance
proceeds under a federal program that gave her
priority, because of formal beneficiary designation
rules, over the wife by a second marriage who
survived the husband . . . This is one example of the
general principle that when the Federal Government
acts in the exercise of its own proper authority, it has
a wide choice of the mechanisms and means to adopt
. . . Congress has the power both to ensure efficiency
in the administration of its programs and to choose
what larger goals and policies to pursue. Other
precedents involving congressional statutes which
affect marriages and family status further illustrate
this point. In addressing the interaction of state
domestic relations and federal immigration law
Congress determined that marriages “entered into for
137
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the purpose of procuring an alien’s admission [to the
United States] as an immigrant” will not qualify the
noncitizen for that status, even if the noncitizen’s
marriage is valid and proper for state-law purposes. .
. And in establishing income-based criteria for Social
Security benefits, Congress decided that although
state law would determine in general who qualifies
as an applicant’s spouse, common-law marriages
also should be recognized, regardless of any
particular State’s view on these relationships.138
Even though the Court recognized the “dignity” of marriage
equality,139 it did not prohibit a federal regulation of marriage in
certain circumstances. Instead, it ruled there are examples that
“establish the constitutionality of limited federal laws that regulate
the meaning of marriage in order to further federal policy.” 140 The
problem with DOMA was that it had simply gone beyond its reach
of what was acceptable.141 Furthermore, although the Court did not
address Congress’s specific authority to regulate immigration
benefits for same-sex spouses, it did use the INA as an example of
permissible congressional statutes that affect marriages to illustrate
the notion that Congress has the power to “ensure efficiency in the
administration of its programs and to choose what larger goals and
policies to pursue.”142 This wording suggests that a future
Congressional attempt to define marriage in certain contexts,
including immigration, would not necessarily be deemed
unconstitutional.
Even more curious is the language at the very end of the
Windsor decision. Justice Kennedy writes that DOMA injures,
“those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in
personhood and dignity.”143 When read in the context of
immigration law, this language takes on special meaning because
138
139
140
141
142
143
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states that recognize same sex marriage cannot possibly “protect”
same-gendered binational spouses who wish to seek immigration
benefits, as immigration is a federal question and one under the
exclusive control of Congress. Such a reading lends support to a
Congressional definition of marriage for immigration purposes.
As for state public policy objections, there is much more
need to exercise caution. The Windsor decision left intact Section 2
of DOMA, which says no state shall be required to give effect to
same-sex marriages recognized in other states.144 In other words,
Section 2 of DOMA still allows states to “formulate their own
public policy regarding the legal recognition of same sex unions,
free from any federal constitutional implications.”145 But in many
ways Section 2 of DOMA is redundant, since states have always
had the ability to choose their own laws over competing laws of
another state – provided the choice is neither arbitrary nor unfair –
because full faith and credit was never intended to compel states to
recognize marriages performed in other states.146 When a state
chooses to recognize the marriage laws of another state, it does so
under the principle of comity – respect for actions of other states.
But comity is a common law principle, and not a constitutional
mandate, and despite this principle, states maintain the ability to
object to those marriages they strongly oppose.147 Common
exceptions to the principle of comity are “natural law exceptions,”
which include marriages that are considered universally offensive,
such as polygamous and incestuous marriages; and “positive law
exceptions,” which include marriages that are prohibited by the
legislature, including those marriages by that state’s own residents
who were married in another jurisdiction for the sole purpose of
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evading their state’s marriage restriction laws.148 Same-sex
marriage, which is not recognized by all fifty states, proves that
these exceptions to the common law principle of comity are still
alive today.
Even though these exceptions to comity would still exist
despite Section 2 of DOMA, this does not mean that Section 2 does
not serve a purpose. Section 2 adds a new section to the Full Faith
and Credit Act that specifically provides that states need not grant
full faith and credit to same-sex marriages performed in other states
that may choose to celebrate them.149 Since the enactment of
DOMA, nearly sixty percent (60%) of states have passed “miniDOMAs” – statutes and constitutional amendments banning the
celebration and/or the recognition of same-sex marriages.150 It is
these “mini-DOMAs” that could be problematic for same-gendered
binational spouses seeking immigration benefits.
i. State Statutes Banning Same-Sex Marriage
At the risk of oversimplifying the legislative process,
citizens of a state elect their legislators, and those legislators make
and pass the laws in the interest of those citizens. This is how
thirty-one states have successfully passed statutes banning same-sex
marriage.151 But what is unclear is what those statutes have to say
in order to express a sufficiently strong public policy. We know
that when the BIA has refused to recognize marriage on state public
policy grounds, those marriages violated criminal laws of the state
of domicile.152 This would suggest, as one scholar has noted, that
since the Supreme Court has held that sexual intimacy and
cohabitation cannot be constitutionally criminalized, no state could
enforce a same-sex criminal statute that rises to the “standard
traditionally required to express a sufficiently strong state public
148
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policy.”153 But such an argument presumes that only criminal
statutes determine public policy, and this is not true. Perhaps the
best example to illustrate this is that of common-law marriage,
since common-law marriage, like same-sex marriage, is recognized
in some states, but not in others, and those states that prohibit it
have no criminal statutes against it.
A common-law marriage is defined as “one that takes legal
effect without license or ceremony.”154 Common-law marriages
have four main elements: capacity to enter into the contract of
marriage, agreement to that contract, cohabitation, and holding
out.155 Of these, the most important element is holding out. 156
Common-law marriage can only be established if the couple hold
themselves out to themselves and to others as a married couple.157
The number of states where common law marriages can be
contracted has substantially reduced over the years, and currently
only nine states and the District of Columbia allow common law
marriages to be contracted within its borders.158
In the case of common-law marriage, the public policy
concern is not whether the act violates a criminal statute, but if the
marriage is declared void by that state. Void marriages do not
comport with legal requirements; they are invalid at inception, and,
unlike voidable marriages, cannot be made valid.159 State courts
have held that void marriages violate public policy, and some have
used common-law marriages to illustrate that point. In the case of
Laikola v. Engineered Concrete, the Minnesota Supreme Court held
153
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that common-law marriages, which are not subject to criminal
statutes but are void in Minnesota, cannot be consummated by
Minnesota residents who visit another state that allows commonlaw marriages.160 The Court held that the obvious implication is
that marriages declared void by a state legislature “demonstrate a
strong public policy.”161 The Court emphasized that its opinion was
based on the fact that common-law marriages in Minnesota are
“void, not merely prohibited.”162
The principle that a common-law marriage considered by a
state to be void violates that state’s public policy has also been
affirmed by the United States Supreme Court. In the case of
Meister v. Moore, the Court held that “in the absence of any
provision declaring marriages not celebrated in a prescribed manner
. . . absolutely void, it is held that all marriages regularly made
according to the common law are valid and binding.”163 Because
the Supreme Court has recognized that void provisions under state
law are permissible, same-sex marriages would arguably violate the
public policy of those states with such provisions in their statutes.
Meister is still good law, and federal courts have since had a long
history of deferring to state law for marital status determinations,
even when there is inconsistency among states as to what
constitutes a marriage.164
When it comes to determining eligibility for immigration
benefits, the same principle applies. Common-law marriages
recognized in the state where celebrated will be accepted for
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immigration purposes.165 However, whereas voidable marriages are
recognized only if there is not a court order declaring the marriage
void,166 void marriages are not marriages, and, therefore, not valid
for immigration purposes.167 In adjudicating immigration petitions,
examiners refer to the Adjudicator’s Field Manual, which describes
itself as a “comprehensive ‘how to’ manual detailing policies and
procedures for all aspects of the Adjudications Program.”168 The
manual reinforces the notion that if a marriage is voidable, but not
void, it will be considered valid for immigration purposes.169
Similarly, the Foreign Affairs Manual, which sets forth the basic
organizational directives of the United States Department of State,
including procedures to follow when issuing visas abroad, offers the
same guidance to consulate officers.170 Following this line of
reasoning, the BIA has refused to recognize a marriage that is void
in the state of domicile even if it was recognized in the state where
it was celebrated.171
The conclusion that can be drawn here is that the state
public policy concern for marriage recognition for immigration
benefits is not solely based on whether the marriage in question
165
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violates a criminal statute, but also takes into consideration whether
the marriage is declared void – and not merely prohibited – by the
domicile state. Applying that principle to same-sex marriage, there
is a state public policy argument that needs to be considered. Of the
thirty-one states that have passed legislation banning same-sex
marriage, nearly half of them specifically state in their statutes that
same-sex marriages are “void.”172 In addition, twelve states have
language in their statutes that specifically say that same-sex
marriage violates that state’s public policy.173 With such language,
there is the possibility that the USCIS or the BIA could reverse
from its current position to hold that same-sex marriages that are
recognized in the location where they are celebrated, but void by
law in the state of domicile, are not valid for immigration purposes
because such marriages violate the public policy of the domicile
state.
ii. State Constitutions Banning Same-Sex
Marriage
Even more problematic for same-gendered spouses seeking
immigration benefits are those states that have amended their
constitutions to prohibit recognition of same-sex marriages, since
amending the constitution is arguably the strongest way for states to
formulate their own public policy. One of the main functions of a
state’s constitution, after all, is to “create the state’s ‘organic law’;
that is, specifying the general, fundamental law to which the state’s
statutes must conform.”174 If citizens are unhappy with the content
172
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of their state’s constitution, they can change it, and if they do not
change it, one can only assume they accept it as it stands.175
While the process of amending a state’s constitution varies
by state,176 the people of the state speak through the political or
electoral process of their state to address constitutional amendments
they desire.177 State constitutional amendments demonstrate a very
strong public policy, as they prevent a state supreme court from
imposing its policy preferences on the people of that state.178 There
are currently twenty-nine states that have amended their
constitutions to prohibit same-sex marriage.179
States with
constitutional amendments prohibiting same-sex marriage have a
strong public policy argument for two reasons: passionate debates
and public referenda were a part of the process to pass the
amendments, and states have no other permissible options to
express their opposition to same-sex relationships.180
Such
constitutional amendments are the “most extreme public policy
objection constitutionally possible.”181
Constitutional amendments pose a unique problem when it
comes to a state’s public policy for refusing to recognize same-sex
marriage because the right of people to govern themselves is a
175
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principal element of freedom, and this includes the right of the
states’ citizens to define marriage as they see fit, even if those
citizens are wrong. As Justice Black stated, “[t]he people, through
their elected representatives, may of course be wrong in making
those determinations, but the right of self-government that our
Constitution preserves is just as important as any of the specific
individual freedoms preserved in the Bill of Rights.”182
Obviously, constitutional amendments banning same sexmarriage create tension between the sovereignty of the people and
the rights of a given minority, and it is precisely this tension on
which the USCIS or the BIA could rely to deny immigration
benefits, on public policy grounds, to same-gendered spouses who
reside in a state whose constitution prevents the state from
recognizing their marriage.
It is worth emphasizing that the current position of the
USCIS is to recognize such marriages despite the public policy of
the domicile state. But the USCIS’s position itself is one that is
problematic. When posed with the question of whether or not the
Service will recognize a same-sex marriage lawfully performed in
the state of celebration, but prohibited by the domicile state, the
Service currently offers the following response:
Yes. As a general matter, the law of the place where
the marriage was celebrated determines whether the
marriage is legally valid for immigration purposes.
Just as USCIS applies all relevant laws to determine
the validity of an opposite-sex marriage, we will
apply all relevant laws to determine the validity of a
same-sex marriage.The domicile state’s laws and
policies on same-sex marriages will not bear on
whether USCIS will recognize a marriage as
valid. [emphasis added]183
But this response is markedly different from the response
that initially appeared on the Service’s website. The initial
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response posted immediately following the Windsor decision read
as follows:
Yes, you can file the petition. In evaluating the
petition, as a general matter, USCIS looks to the law
of the place where the marriage took place when
determining whether it is valid for immigration law
purposes. That general rule is subject to some
limited exceptions under which federal immigration
agencies historically have considered the law of the
state of residence in addition to the law of the state
of celebration of the marriage. Whether those
exceptions apply may depend on individual, factspecific circumstances. If necessary, we may need
to provide further guidance on this question going
forward.184
From the USCIS’s most recent statement, it appears as
though the agency has determined that state public policy
objections no longer apply in determining marriage validity,
regardless of whether or not the marriage is a same-sex marriage or
an opposite-sex marriage. But such a position is inconsistent with
case law and with the agency’s own internal procedures, as stated in
government policy manuals such as the Adjudicator’s Field
Manual185 and the United States Department of State Foreign
Affairs Manual.186 If anything, the Service’s shift in stance
illustrates the fragility of the state public policy prong. The agency
changed its response through a Question & Answer comment
posted on its web page, and not by using solid foundational
administrative law principles. In adapting this policy the USCIS
has arguably dismissed prior case law and administrative law
principles of rulemaking, making itself susceptible to litigation that
could bring state public policy arguments back in the foreground.
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iii. Solutions to State Statutes and State
Constitutions Banning Same-Sex
Marriage
As “mini-DOMAs” pose the most solid arguments in favor
of a state public policy strong enough to allow the refusal of
recognition of same-sex marriages for immigration purposes, it is
imperative for supporters of same-sex marriage to find a lasting
solution to prevent the USCIS or the BIA from taking this position.
One solution would be a court challenge in which the
Supreme Court determines that sexual orientation is a suspect class
that warrants heightened scrutiny under constitutional analysis. As
it stands, despite the Windsor decision, sexual orientation, unlike
racial discrimination, has not been made a suspect class and,
consequently, does not undergo the same level of scrutiny when
used as a basis for discrimination.187 Defining marriage to exclude
same-sex spouses is, arguably, a form of gender discrimination, and
gender discrimination warrants heightened scrutiny.188 The Court
could even go so far as to declare sexual orientation an immutable
characteristic, in turn ruling that discrimination based on sexual
orientation renders even higher scrutiny. Either ruling would
invalidate statutes that prohibit same-sex marriage, and would
declare unconstitutional those amendments that define marriage as
only between one man and one woman because they violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. While the United States Supreme Court
has ruled that state constitutional amendments that discriminate
against LGBT members of society are unconstitutional violations of
equal protection, it has not ruled that sexual orientation is a
protected class that calls for a heightened level of review. For
example, in Romer v. Evans, the Court held that an amendment to
187
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Colorado’s constitution that prohibited the state or local
government from adopting measures that would protect
homosexuals was a classification undertaken for its own sake and,
therefore, a violation of equal protection.189 But the Romer Court
made its decision using a rational basis review, and a similar ruling
in cases concerning statutes or amendments that define marriage –
something traditionally left to the states – remains uncertain.
Another solution would be a fundamental right challenge. A
fundamental right is a “right derived from natural or fundamental
law.”190 It is a “significant component of liberty, encroachments of
which are rigorously tested by courts to ascertain the soundness of
purported governmental justifications.”191 Fundamental right
challenges warrant strict scrutiny to determine whether the law
violates the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of
the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. Strict
scrutiny is the most stringent standard applied by the courts under
judicial review, and favors an individual’s fundamental right over
the governmental regulation suppressing that right. To pass strict
scrutiny, the government must have a compelling interest, establish
law that is narrowly tailored to that interest, and use the least
restrictive means to achieve that goal. Since 1888, the United
States Supreme Court has held fourteen times that marriage is a
fundamental right of all people, and the deprivation of that right
warrants strict scrutiny,192 but it has yet to apply that rule to
189
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marriage among same sex couples. It came close to doing so in
rendering its decision in Lawrence v. Texas, when the Court issued
the following statement, “our laws and tradition afford
constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, and education [. .
.]. Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for
these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.”193 But Lawrence
was not a case questioning the constitutionality of same-sex
marriage; it was a case questioning anti-sodomy laws.
Nevertheless, it could lend support to a constitutional challenge to
state statutes and state constitutions that ban same sex marriage.
Regrettably, when given the chance to make either of these
determinations, the Windsor Court fell short, missing its
U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (ruling that marriage is fundamental to existence and survival);
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376, 383 (1971) (“[M]arriage involves
interests of basic importance to our society” and is “a fundamental human
relationship.”); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)
(“This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of
marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 499 (1977) (“[W]hen the government intrudes on choices concerning family
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governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the
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opportunity to strike down the many state laws and constitutions
that continue to impose the traditional limits of marriage.194
CONCLUSION
Under the United States Constitution, Congress’s plenary
power grants almost total control over immigration. While many
applaud the decision of the USCIS to recognize the validity of
same-sex marriages in granting immigration benefits, there is
nothing to prevent Congress from imposing limits on same-sex
marriage for immigration purposes, and nothing to prevent the
USCIS from shifting its position in the future. Furthermore, despite
the repeal of Section 3 of DOMA, there is no uniform rule
recognizing all same sex marriages under the INA. Same-sex
marriage should continue to be recognized for immigration
purposes provided they pass the three prong test; first, they must be
recognized in the place of celebration; second, they must be bona
fide; and third, they must not violate federal or public policy.
Under the current fragile system, same-sex marriages run the risk of
a heightened bar in proving they are bona fide. They also run the
risk of being considered a violation of public policy where domicile
states have passed legislation making such marriages void and
invalid, or have amended their constitutions to prohibit the
recognition of such marriages. For these reasons one of three things
must happen: (1) Congress must amend the INA to specifically
recognize the validity of same-sex marriages despite state public
policy objections; (2) the federal courts must recognize same-sex
marriages despite these similar objections; or (3) the Supreme Court
must rule either that sexual orientation is a protected status
deserving of heightened scrutiny, or that the fundamental right to
marriage applies to same-sex couples, and deserves a strict scrutiny
level of review. With either of these two rulings, the Supreme
Court would invalidate state constitutional amendments banning
same-sex marriages and, in turn, weaken state public policy
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arguments against the recognition of same-sex marriages for
immigration purposes.

